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Abstract

Long-Run Structural and Productivity Change in U.S.
Agriculture: Effects of Prices and Policies

by Wallace E. Huffman and Robert E. Evenson

This paper presents (1) a conceptual framework for structural change when farms may be
multiproduct or specialized and (2) an econometrics examination of causes of structural and total
factor productivity (TFP) change for U.S. agriculture. Farm size, farm specialization, and part-time
farming are the structural dimension emphasized, and they become potential channels to TFP change.
Using state aggregate data starting in 1950, we conclude that input prices, public and private research,
public extension, and government commodity programs have directly and indirectly caused change in
U.S. farm structure and TFP. Our results suggest that changes in farm size, however, have been
dominated by input price changes rather than by technology or government programs.
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Long-Run Structural and Productivity Change in U.S.
Agriculture: Effects of Prices and Policies

by Wallace E. Huffman and Robert E. Evenson*

A century ago, U.S. farms numbered 4.9 million, and the number of farms grew slowly, peaking
about 1920 at 6.4 million. Since then, a long term decline in farm numbers has occurred with the rate
being especially rapid during 1950-70 (-3.3% per year compound). The rate of decline slowed
considerably during the 1970s but increased during the 1980s. In 1990, there were 1.9 million U.S.
farms. Given steady growth in U.S. aggregate agricultural output (at 1.8% over past 100 years and
2.1% for past 50 years), average farm size on (real) output base has increased. The average rate of
increase in farm size (using the output measure) was only 0.9 percent per annum (compounded) from
1890 to 1940, but it was a much faster 4.4 percent per annum during the past 50 years. Average farm
size was 1.6 times larger in 1940 than in 1890, but 8.8 times larger in 1990 than in 1940.
A century ago, 87 percent of the farm inputs were supplied by farmers (primarily labor, land
services, animal power, livestock feed, and seed); only 12 percent were commercial, i.e., purchases of
intermediate inputs from nonfarmers (Kendrick 1961, 347). In contrast, in 1990 more than 45
percent of the farm inputs (e.g., agricultural chemicals, energy, seed, livestock feed, machinery and
equipment) were commercial (USDA 1991, Table 3.1). The most dramatic changes have been
associated with labor, a decline in labor's production cost share--from over 50 percent to about 24
percent (Ball, Matson, and Somwaru 1994) and decline in labor intensity relative to chemicals,
machinery, and land (Gardner 1992). Furthermore, the technologies embodied in inputs have changed
dramatically over the past century or half century (see Huffman and Evenson 1993). The technologies
embodied in new seed varieties, breeding stock, farm chemicals, farm machinery, and information
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systems are much different than in the distant past (Office of Technology Assessment 1992; National
Research Council).
The objective of this paper is to present a conceptual framework for structural change where
farms may be multiproduct or specialized and an econometric examination of causes of structural and
total factor productivity (TFP) change for U.S. agriculture using state aggregate data. Farm size, farm
specialization, and part-time farming are the structural dimensions emphasized. Hypotheses tested are
that input prices, public and private research, public extension, and government commodity programs
cause structural and TFP change in U.S. agriculture and that part of productivity change is channeled
through structural change.
Many of the early trends in farm and enterprise size and scale are summarized by Ball and
Heady (1972). Quance and Tweeten (1972) summarize some of the effects of price support, supply
controls and other farm policies on farm size starting in 1930. During the past 40 years, livestock
production, especially poultry, dairy, and cattle finishing, and to a lesser extent crop production have
become increasingly specialized on fewer and larger farms (see Huffman and Evenson 1993b, Ch.7).
Other studies of structure of American agriculture include Hallam (1993b), Gardner and Pope (1978),
Huffman (1980), Barkley (1990), Gale (1993), Gardner (1992), Goddard et al. (1993), Kislev and
Peterson (1982, 1996), Sumner and Leiby (1987), Moschini (1990), and Zepeda (1995). Kislev and
Peterson relate change in farm size to change in the off-farm wage, an opportunity cost of farm labor,
and change in available agricultural technology. Griliches (1963) suggested that economies of scale
and increased specialization in agriculture were part of the TFP story for U.S. agriculture. Most later
studies for U.S. agriculture, however, have ignored the interrelationship between TFP and structure of
agriculture, e.g., Huffman and Evenson (1993b), Chavas and Cox (1992), Evenson (1980), Knutson
and Tweeten (1979). Our current paper builds upon preliminary analyses undertaken earlier of public
policies on agricultural productivity and structure of agriculture (Evenson and Kramer 1988; Huffman
and Evenson 1993a).
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Industrial Structure: A Conceptual Perspective
Farms are typically multiproduct, but the variety of products produced has changed over time.
Most of the discussion of structure in the agricultural economics literature, however, has used single
product technology (Hallam 1993b), and this limits significantly the options for structural adjustment
when economic forces facing agriculture change. We present a precise definition of economics of size
and scope of multiproduct firms. Hence, the model must permit firms/farms to be multiproduct or
specialized.
Consider the following farm/firm level multiproduct (total) cost function:
(1)

C

C (q; w, , )

where q is px1 vector of products/outputs, w is a vector of input prices,
and

is a vector of technologies,

is a vector of governmental policies. The cost function is concave in w and homogeneous of

degree 1 in w (see Varian 1992; Chambers 1988). In addition, the (total) cost function may include
fixed cost of generally useful inputs, e.g., firm-specific public inputs and product-specific fixed costs.
When the cost function is multiproduct, no natural scalar quantity exists to define average
cost. One alternative is to measure cost along a product ray, as in Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982).
Product-ray average cost of producing the output vector q ( 0 ) can be defined as
p

(2)

RAC ( q , w , , )

C (q; w, , ) /
i 1

qi .

Implicitly the attribute of RAC that makes it exact is the product mix is being held constant as changes
are occurring. RAC ( q , w , , ) declines (increases) when a small proportional change in all outputs
causes a less than (larger than 1 equal) proportional change in total cost. For each product-ray, there
will be a point where RAC is a minimum (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982).
For the single output case (p=1), scale (S) can be defined as the ratio of average (total) cost to
marginal cost or the inverse of the quantity elasticity of (total) cost, i.e., S = AC/MC = 1/ecq . For
p>2, define the degree of scale economies over the entire product set, holding the output mix constant,
as:
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p

(3)

Sp ( q , w , , )

where Ci

C(·)/ qi

C (q; w, , ) /
i 1

qi Ci ( q , w , , p )

MCi ( q ; w , , ) or marginal cost of product i. Scale economies at q are

increasing, decreasing, or constant if Sp > 1, < 1, or = 1. Sp can be interpreted as the inverse of the
elasticity of total cost with respect to a 1 percent increase in all outputs. Because Sp is measured for a
given product mix, changing the product mix can reasonably be expected to change Sp .
As economic conditions change, a farm might increase or decrease the number of outputs
produced, i.e., expand or contract their “product line.” Hence, product/output-specific cost concepts
become important and useful. Define “incremental cost” for product qi at q as
(4)

ICi (q , w , , )

C (q, w, , )

C ( qp i , w , , )

where qp-i is a px1 vector of outputs with a zero quantity inserted for the i-th output, qi, and all other
outputs are the same as in q.1 Then average incremental cost is AICi ( q , w , , )
ICi ( q , w , , ) / qi . If a farm is considering adding a product qi to its mix, an increment to fixed (and
sunk) may be required.2 Product-specific fixed (or sunk) costs imply that the cost function C(·) is
discontinuous, having one or more jumps in it. Product-specific scale economies can be defined as,
Si ( q , w , , )

AICi ( q , w , , ) / Ci ( q , w , , ) , i.e., the ratio of average incremental cost to

marginal cost for output i.3
For multioutput farms to be economically successful, they must have some cost advantages
over more specialized farms, including those farms that produce only one of many possible products of
the industry. Consider an industry with two outputs, then it is possible that
C ( q1 , q2 ) < C ( q1 , 0 )

C ( 0 , q2 ) , i.e., total cost of producing a given quantity of q1 and q2 is less if it

is undertaken in one farm producing both of them, e.g., grain and animals, than in two separate farms
that specialize in the production of a single output, grain or animals. Because we observe that no farm
produces anything like the more than 200 total products of the U.S. agriculture industry, some
diseconomies of scope (and limiting specialized resources) must exist.
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Intra-farm spillover effects of product mix may occur which create a type of scope economies or
diseconomies. Partition the p products into two groups, t and p-t, then the degree of economies of
scope can be defined as:
(5)

SCt ( q , w , , )

C ( qt , w , , )

C ( qp t , w , , )

C(q,w, , ) / C(q, w, , )

Panzer and Willig (1980) and Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982). It measures the difference in cost
when p outputs are produced on two separate farms, one produces t of them and the other producing
the p-t remaining ones versus producing all p of the outputs on one farm. If SCt ( q , w , , ) < 0, then
splitting up industry production into separate “specialized” farms reduces industry cost.4
Economies of scope and economies of scale are related:

(6)

Sp ( q , w , , )

t

St ( q , w , , )
1

(1

t

) Sp t ( q , w , , )

SCt ( q , w , , )
t

where St and Sp-t are “product- or sector-specific” scale economy measures and

t

j 1

p

qj Cj /

j 1

qi Cj ,

Baumol, Panzar; and Willig (1982). If no scope economies exist,
SCt = 0, then scale economies for a p-product farm is just, Sp

t

St

(1

t

) Sp t , or a weighted

average of the product- or sector-specific scale economies for farms specializing in product groups t and
p-t. If scope economic exist, SCt > 0, multiproduct farms will tend to have a cost advantage over
specialized farms. Furthermore, scale diseconomies could exist for the specialized farms, i.e., St and Sp-t
< 0; but with sufficient economies of scope, the farms producing p-products could have scale
economies. This situation would give a major economic advantage to the diversified farms relative to
specialized farms. If scope diseconomies exist, then specialized farms will tend to have a cost
advantage over diversified farms.
In the midwest from 1900 to the 1950s, a larger share of farms produced feed grains,
leguminous meadow, beef, swine, dairy, poultry, fruit, and vegetable outputs. They were what the
Census of Agriculture counted as general farms. A very small share of the midwestern farms of this era
specialized in sub-groups of these outputs, which suggests that significant economies of scope existed at
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that time. In the 1990s, however, we observe farms of the midwest to be relatively more specialized,
producing crops or livestock but not both. Also, among farms producing crops the number of crops has
been reduced, and among farms producing livestock, the number of different types has been reduced.
A hypothesis is that technical change in U.S. agriculture since the 1960s has reduced economies of
scope.
What is the real foundation for scope economies? With multiproduct production, weak cost
complementarities are a sufficient condition to insure economies of scope. Weak cost complementarity
over the product set p up to q exists if
MCi ( q̂ , w , , ) / qj

0, i

2

C ( q̂ , w , , ) / qi qj

j , for all q̂ , 0

q̂

q , with the inequality holding over q̂ > 0 (see

Baumol, Panzar, Willig 1982). With weak cost complementarity, the marginal cost of producing any
output i jointly with other outputs decreases when the quantity produced of any other output j
increases. Furthermore, the concept can be extended to situations where product-specific fixed costs
exist. Consider the cost function C(q) = F(t) + c(q) where F(t) is the product-specific fixed cost
associated with qt > 0 and c(q) is twice differentiable and exhibiting weak complementarity over
output set t up to q. Then, if F(t) + F(p-t)

F(p), the cost function exhibits economies of scope. If

the inequality is reversed diseconomies of scope occur.
What are the practical implications of cost complementaries and scope economies for
agriculture? In some cases, production is truly joint, e.g., wheat and wheat straw, beef and beef hides,
wool and mutton, cow’s milk and veal. In other cases, the jointness is very much affected by relative
input prices and the state of technology, e.g., crops and livestock. Farm/firm-specific pure public inputs
also give scope economies. In this case, an input when acquired for the production of qi by a farm is
available costlessly for the production of other outputs; for example, local weather and climatic
information, biological information about production processes, and accounting and information
processing skills of farm operators.
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Also, quasi-public inputs can be shared by two or more production processes without complete
congestion, e.g. services of general durable goods that are available in large discrete units, being
somewhat indivisible or lumpy. These include farm tractors, farm shops, general purpose barns, trucks
and cars, and farm operators/managers. When technology is embodied in new durable goods, they may
become somewhat product-specific in their usefulness, e.g., automatic temperature, feed, and water
controlled swine farrowing houses; environmentally controlled pig nurseries; confined broiler growing
houses, confined swine finishing buildings; electronically controlled, dairy milking and feeding
parlors/farms; no-till planters, self-propelled combines; grain drying equipment and storage facilities.
Also, new technologies of livestock and poultry disease control use isolation of one animal species from
another, e.g., swine from poultry, or one age-group of a given species from another, e.g., baby pigs from
older pigs. This reduces scope economies in livestock production and increases scale economies under
farm specialization. Increases in product-specific fixed costs which are associated with specialized
buildings/facilities and equipment for livestock and crop productoin seem to have been a major source
of recent U.S. product-specific scale economies and reduced economies of scope. The developments of
large scale planting and harvesting technologies for grain crops are not too dramatic for scale
economics because of limits on use due to seasonal plant cycles and uncertain weather.
Changes in w and

can change economies of scale and scope and the equilibrium product mix

of farms and total number of farms for the industry. To see the impact of a change in input price wi on
scale economies measured along a product-ray, return to equation (3) and let wi change:

(7)

wi

Sp

Sp

wi

wi xi

I

si 1

Sp

1

e i p , si

C

, e ip

q

xi

xi

q

(Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982, p. 157). Scale economies with a broad product mix will increase
I

(decrease or stay unchanged), if 1

Sp

1

e i p > 0 (< 0 or = 0). A positive relationship is more

likely when scale diseconomies exist, i.e., Sp < 1, and the impact is proportional to the size of the cost
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share of the input whose price changes. For example, labor was a large share of the cost of agricultural
production in 1950, and with wage rates rising over time (relative to the price of other inputs), the
potential exists for a large impact on scale economies.
Scope economies may be affected by a change in wi, too. Let’s consider specialization into two
sectors producing t and p-t outputs, then the effect of wi on the relative degree of scope economies is:
(8)

wi

S Ct

wi xi ( q )

S Cti

S Ct

wi

C(q)

S Ct

1

where SCt is defined in eq(5) and SCti = xi ( qt , w , , )

xi ( qp t , w , , )

xi ( q , w , , ) / xi [ q , w , , ] . Hence, if the percentage cost saving in use of input xi
achieved by producing all p products together is greater than the saving in total cost by producing split
into two product groups, a increase in wi will increase scope economies. Otherwise scope economies
will decrease (or remain unchanged).
The implications for scope economies are most easily seen by considering special cases. First, if
input xi is used in fixed proportion with output, e.g. like seed, then SCti = 0 and SCt / wi < 0, and an
increase (decrease) in wi reduces (increases) economies of scope. Second, if input xi is a firm’s purepublic input, then xi(q) = xi (qt) = xi (qp-t), SCti = 1 and SCt < 1, so SCt / wi > 0. Thus, if the price
of a pure public input increases(decreases), scope economies increase(decrease). A conjecture is that
the relative price of farm-specific public inputs has declined on average over the past 45 years, and this
has reduced economies of scope in agriculture. Third, when transray convexity of the multiproduct
cost function exists and input price wi decreases, the increase in outputs (which are proportional along
a product-ray) is greater in proportion than the increase in the input whose price has fallen. This
reduces economies of scope or increases specialization and reduces opportunities for sharing of a firm’s
quasi-public inputs. Another conjecture is that the relative price of farm’s quasi public inputs have
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decreased over the past 45 years and this has decreased economies of scope and contributed to
specialization.
Government commodity (and conservation) policies affect output prices and have in the past
placed restrictions on crop rotations, land use, and eligibility to produce particular commodities.
These restrictions affect cost surfaces, some have multiple output effects and others are commodity
specific. The programs in effect 1950-1995 seem likely to have reduced product-specific scale
economies. The effect on scope economies seems ambiguous because the crop programs have
contained strong incentives to protect base acres which reduces the diversity of crops produced. The
conservation compliance requirements starting in the late-1980s most likely made a small contribution
to crop output diversity of farms because they placed severe restrictions on soybean and other row crop
production on land with high erosion-rate potential.

The Empirical Model
In the previous section, farm cost was linked to input prices, technologies, and governmental
policies. If inputs and outputs are separable, then total factor productivity can be represented as a
ratio of the farm output index to the farm input index. Farmers’ engage in part-time rather than fulltime farming as a result of the relative attractiveness of on-farm and off-farm uses of farmers’ labor
which differ regionally and change over time (Ahearn and Lee 1991; Huffman 1980; Barkley 1990).
With a significant decline in the demand for farm labor since about 1950, an increase in part-time
farming might be associated with productivity gains in agriculture. Alternatively, a farmer’s off-farm
work may take time away from farm related activities of gathering technical information and early
technology adoption (Wozniak 1993), which would reduce productivity of agriculture.
In this study, empirical measures of farm specialization, farm size, and part-time farming are
linked to agricultural productivitiy in the empirical model.5 Furthermore, we test that input prices,
public and private research, public extension, and government commodity programs cause structural
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and TFP changes and that part of TFP change is channeled through structural change. Although much
of the discussion of structural change in U.S. agriculture has focused at the national aggregate level or
individual farm level, we propose to examine state aggregate data to build on past data construction
efforts, to obtain substantial variation in variables, and to obtain substantial degrees of freedom for
testing our model.
Both “short-run” and “long-run” perspectives on relationships among variables are considered.
In the short-run, we suggest that interesting agricultural structural interactions occur which are best
viewed in a simultaneous equation framework. In this format, the "endogenous" variables of the
econometric model are:
-

Total Factor Productivity (measured for both the crop and livestock sectors),

-

Specialization Indexes (measured for both the crop and livestock sectors),

-

Farm Size (measured for the aggregate agricultural sector),

-

Part-Time Farming (measured for the aggregate agricultural sector).

The "exogenous" variables of the model are:
-

Prices (treated as exogenous at the state level),6

-

Technology (as measured by research and extension variables),

-

Farmers Skills (as measured by schooling indexes),

-

Institutions (farm program and geoclimatic variables).

We suggest that farmers find it costly to change farm size, farm specialization, and parttime farming participation in the short-run. As a first approximation, farmers behave as if size,
specialization, and part-time farming are fixed. When farm output and input prices, new technologies,
infrastructure, and institutions change, farmers respond by changing the quantity demanded of inputs
and quantity supplied of outputs as suggested by a restricted profit function. Suppose, for example,
that improvements in animal health technologies enable more effective control of animal diseases

11
under high density-confined-isolated conditions and production using new technologies is not land
intensive or climate sensitive. This would create product-specific scale economies enabling larger
concentrated production units. As farmers respond to these scale opportunities by building larger
technically enhanced units, incentives for changing the scope/specialization of the farm and part-time
farming seem likely to occur. Human capital needed for specialized activities is costly to create and
economic incentives exist because of finite life and an annual time constraint for individuals and
managers to specialize their work (Becker 1975, Huffman 1985).
We have suggested that new technology becoming available is one cause of structural change.
For example, the initiating factor might be the invention of and the commercializations of new animal
health technology. This, in turn, leads to trial and adoption by farmers who discover that they can
now build larger product specific units without experiencing the severity of disease problems associated
with larger units in the past. Because the new technology requires a significant fixed cost and specie
isolation, the incentive is to specialize or narrow the scope of the farming operation and to most likely
reduce the economic attractiveness of off-farm work and to change the size of the farm which creates
structural interactions between the endogenous variables. The productivity response to the new
technology will unfold over time.
Relative input prices, e.g., the price of machinery and fertilizer relative to the wage rate for
hired farm labor can be expected to twist cost surfaces and to affect size (and specialization). Hayami
and Ruttan (1985) expressed the belief that “the scale economies usually stem from the lumpiness or
indivisibility of fixed capital” (p. 146). For example, when a machine is large and its price is high, the
opportunity cost of under utilizing machine services is great. A large farming operation is one way of
more fully utilizing lumpy farm machinery. Kislev and Peterson (1982, 1996) counter that in the long
run the size of machinery, herds, etc., are continuous and not lumpy. In the few cases where large
machines have a major efficiency advantage over smaller ones, rental markets develop. Hence, they
argue that relative input ratios are the driving force behind farm size and not large machines (or
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buildings) driving farm size. Hence, they see a rise in the wage-rental ratio as being the major force
behind the long-term increase in U.S. average farm size. Also, when the price of fertilizer is high,
incentives exist for farmers to substitute away from commercial fertilizers toward livestock manures
and organic forms of fertilizer. This requires relatively more land and livestock resources which
increases farm size and reduces specialization.
Major differences in the role of land and climate, potential for successful applications of
science, and shapes of cost curves are reasons for considering crop and livestock specialization and
productivity separately. Empirical evidence shows that average cost of production for specialized
farming enterprises at a point in time first declines as output increases and then flattens out, e.g., flat
bottomed cost curves, and eventually turn up (Hallam 1991; Hallam 1993a; Moschini 1990).
Furthermore, the length of the flat section is in a sense much longer for specialized livestock than for
crop production (Hallam 1993a). Some of the differences in cost curve shapes for crop and
livestock enterprises are due to differences in the use of land and impact of weather/climate
(e.g., geoclimatic region). Almost all agricultural crops are photo-period or length of growing season
sensitive, and the potential maximum length of this season is set by nature. Because planting and
other field work use up valuable potential growing season time and crop yields are very sensitive to
timeliness, this severely limits the size of crop producing farms. No one state can be operated as a
single farm. Modern poultry, dairy, and swine producing enterprises use relatively little land and much
confined housing which greatly reduces weather/climatic effects.

The Empirical Analysis
In this section, we describe the data and the six equation econometric model of agricultural
structure and productivity and present and evaluate the econometric results.
The Data and Econometric Model
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This study builds upon the earlier Huffman and Evenson model and data for state multifactor
productivity (Huffman and Evenson 1992; 1993b) primarily by including new variables and equations
for specialization, size, and part-time farming. In the earlier Huffman and Evenson model, state
multifactor productivity was expressed as a three equation model, one each for a crop sector, livestock
sector, and aggregate agricultural multifactor productivity.
The Huffman-Evenson data set (see Huffman and Evenson 1993b, pp.192-94) was developed
at Yale University, and it builds upon the recommendations of the AAEA Task Force on Productivity
Statistics (USDA 1980) and earlier work by Landau and Evenson. In this data set, the New England
states, Alaska, and Hawaii were excluded primarily because they accounted for a small share of total
U.S. farm output (about 2% in 1974), and this share has been declining over time. In addition, Alaska
and Hawaii are geographically isolated from the other forty-eight contiguous states, and this isolation
makes spillovers of public agricultural research different than for contiguous states. Thus, forty-two of
the fifty states are included in this study. This data set spans the years of 1950-82. Although it would
be nice if the data extended to the mid-1990s, it would require a large investment to do this.
Definitions of all of the variables used in this article for the econometric model are summarized
in Table 1. The six endogenous variables are TFPC, TFPL, SPLZEC, SPLZEL, SIZE, and OF/(1-OF),
or odds of off-farm work. Both crop and livestock specialization indexes are derived. Each
specialization index measures the extent to which farms in a particular state specialize in the
production of major crop or livestock commodities. Hence, they are indexes of farm-level
specialization and not state average specialization. For crop specialization, we have five types that are
weighted: cash grain farms, vegetables and melon farms, fruits and tree nut farms, cotton and tobacco
farms, and other field crop farms. For livestock specialization, we have only three types that are
weighted: poultry farms, dairy farms, and other livestock farms.7
The farm-size index (SIZE) is an index of the average (real) services obtained from relatively
fixed capital used in farming. It is the annual service flow from cropland-equivalent farmland and from
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farm machinery and breeding stock. This measure of farm size differs from a size measure based
strictly on tillable farmland (Kislev and Peterson 1982, 1996; Batte and Sonka 1985). Our measure,
also, is not strictly natural resource-based because it includes services from reproducible capital
to better approximate a critical dimension of farms that is more closely associated with capital needed
for annual production than with land area (or value).
Part-time farming is represented by the odds of off-farm work by farmers on an annual basis.
Total factor productivity in this study is expressed differently than in the earlier Huffman and Evenson
papers (1992, 1993b) in the sense that we use a five-year moving average of annual multifactor
productivity rather than the actual annual values. The reason for this change is our emphasis in this
paper on structure and organization of agriculture which we believe to be a medium- to long-run
phenomena. The five-year averaging removes a lot of "noise" from the productivity series.
In this article, the econometric model of agricultural structure and productivity is a sixequation structural model. There are a total of 38 exogenous variables in the model, including
15 geoclimatic variables. The latter variables represent region-specific fixed effects over the period of
analysis that seem likely to affect structure of agriculture and TFP. The two productivity equations
have specifications similar to Huffman and Evenson (1992, 1993b). The two farm specialization
equations contain 27 exogenous variables, and the farm size and off-farm participation equations
contain 30 exogenous variables. Interaction effects/variables are excluded from these last four
equations to simplify the relationships in seemingly reasonable ways.
The structural model is highly integrated in the sense that all equations contain a total of three
or four (but not all the same) endogenous variables; the left-hand side variable and two or three
endogenous variables. It is also consistent with some farm structure variables not being directly
related. This structure permits us to examine the joint explanation/ determination of agricultural
structure and productivity and to examine the effects of (1) specialization and size on part-time
farming, (2) specialization and part-time farming on size, (3) size and part-time farming on
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specialization, and (4) specialization, size, and part-time farming on agricultural productivity.8 These
are relationships about which little empirical evidence exists in the literature (e.g., see Hallam 1993b).
The Econometric Results
The econometric model of agricultural structure and productivity was estimated using threestage least squares to take account of endogeneity of regressors and contemporaneous correlation of
disturbances. Coefficients are reported in Table 2. The model fits well in the sense of having a system
R-square of 0.70, and a large share of the estimated structural coefficients are significantly different
from zero at the five percent level, including 15 of the 16 estimated coefficients of the included
endogenous variables. These results are interpreted as strong support for the hypothesis that input
prices, public and private research, public extension, and government commodity programs directly
and indirectly caused structural and TFP change in U.S. agriculture during 1950-82.
Because of the complexities of the structural model and the interaction terms in the
productivity equations, we have computed the implied reduced-form coefficients for the model and
they are presented in Table 3.9 In order to get to bottom line issues which are closer to the published
literature, much of our discussion focuses on the implied reduced-form coefficients. The structural
equations do, however, provide information about the relationship among farm structural variables and
between TFP and farm structure, holding the exogenous variables constant, and they are emphasized.
Part-Time Farming (off-farm work). Part-time and full-time occupations as a farmer are conditioned
on the individual having a farm business. When economic conditions change adversely toward
agriculture, some farmers leave agriculture for other occupations or retire (see Huang and Orazem
1997). Given that individuals continue farming, the reduced-form coefficients suggest that the odds of
farm operators' working off the farm are reduced by technology associated with public sector crop and
livestock research. Additional private sector crop research, which has on average a more directly
applied focus than public research, increases the odds of off-farm work. The two extension variables
pull in opposite directions. An increase of crop extension decreases the odds of off-farm work, but
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additional public livestock extension increases it. Additional farmers' schooling increases the odds of
off-farm work among those who continue in farming.
The farm and off-farm wage rates have very different effects on the odds of part-time farming.
An increase in the opportunity (off-farm) wage (WAGEMG) increases the odds of off-farm work by
farmers, but an increase in the farm wage (WAGEF) has the opposite effect. These effects are expected
when skills of farm operators and hired farm labor are quite different (see Huffman 1996). An increase
in crop price supports, which both increases the expected crop prices and reduces price variability,
reduces the odds of off-farm work, but an increase of the dairy price support increases it.
The structural equation for off-farm work shows, other things equal, that an increase of crop
specialization reduces the odds of off-farm work of farmers, but an increase in livestock specialization
and farm size increases the odds of off-farm work. Hence, livestock specialization might be interpreted
as being more compatible than crop specialization with off-farm work during the study period. The
positive structural effect of farm size on the odds of off-farm work is possible when the total number of
farms decreases. Being part-time rather than full-time in farming is then part of the transition of labor
out of agriculture (Huffman 1991).
Farm Size. The reduced-form coefficient estimates for explaining farm-size suggest strongly that
public sector research programs have little effect on long-term changes in farm size. But added private
crop research leads to reduced farm size while added private livestock research leads to increased farm
size (as does livestock extension). The key variables explaining farm size, however, are prices. An
increase in the opportunity (nonfarm) wage rate increases average farm size with a relatively large
elasticity (partly through the off-farm work effect.) A decrease in the real machine price also increases
farm size. These results support the earlier findings of Kislev and Peterson (1982; 1996).
An increase in both crop and dairy price supports have negative effects on farm size, but an
increase in diversion payments increase farm size. Hence, government farm programs have been a
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factor in explaining past changes in farm size, and the recent major restructuring of farm programs
seems likely to cause average farm size to increase.
The structural equation for farm size shows, other things equal, that an increase in crop
specialization or odds of off-farm work increases farm size. An increase of livestock specialization,
however, reduces farm size. We suggest that the different effects of crop and livestock specialization
on farm size are related to differences in the role played by land in specialization of the two sectors.
The positive effect of off-farm work on size might occur if income from off-farm work is used to
guarantee payments on farm assets. The effect could also be associated with a change in farm size
distribution.
Specialization (crops). The reduced-form coefficient estimates explaining crop specialization have
relatively small research effects. Both larger public and private crop research reduce crop
specialization. Additional crop extension, however, does increase crop specialization.
Input prices, on the other hand, have quite substantial effects. An increase of the nonfarm and
farm wage rates increase specialization as does a decrease in machinery prices. Higher government
price supports (both crop and dairy) increase crop specialization. This occurs in spite of program
payment limits. Large diversion payments retard crop specialization.
The structural equation for crop specialization shows that an increase in farm size increases
crop specialization. This result suggests a narrowing of scope as farm size increases. An increase in the
odds of off-farm work reduces crop specialization. When a farmer participates in off-farm work, it
generally places limitations on the amount of time that he can allocate to timely planting and
harvesting activities of any given crop. For a given size of farm, diversified cropping permits spreading
out timing of planting and harvesting activities.
Specialization (livestock). The reduced-form (and structural) coefficient estimates for livestock
specialization are in general the opposite of those for crop specialization. Additional public livestock
research increases livestock specialization. In contrast, additional private livestock research, which is

18
more applied and heavily focused on commercial products for farmers than public livestock research,
reduces livestock specialization during the study period. This negative effect of private livestock
research may seem puzzling to some because of the recent advances in animal health practices that
seem to be heavily based on specie or age-group isolation. We acknowledge that the direction of
private livestock research over the past decade seems most likely associated with greater livestock
specialization. An increase in livestock extension has a large positive impact on livestock
specialization.
Input prices have modest effects on livestock specialization. An increase of wage rates (farm
and nonfarm) retard specialization, an increase of the fertilizer price retards it, and an increase of the
machine price stimulates it. Higher government price supports (both crop and dairy) retard livestock
specialization, but a larger diversion payments increase livestock specialization.
The structural equation for livestock specialization shows that an increase in farm size reduces
livestock specialization or causes a broadening of scope. An increase in the odds of off-farm work
increases livestock specialization. The performance of most livestock enterprises is less closely tied to
day length and good weather than for crop enterprises, and this seems to one the source of differences
in the effect of off-farm work on livestock and crop specialization.
Total Factor Productivity. One impetus for this paper was a question by Griliches about the
possibility that changes in farm size and specialization are part of a broad story of TFP changes in U.S.
agriculture over 1950-82, as he had found in earlier data (Griliches 1963). The structural equation for
crop and livestock sector TFPs show, other things equal, that an increase in specialization increases
productivity (significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level). In the crop sector, the impact of
additional crop specialization is very large, having an elasticity of 1.1. In the livestock sector, the
impact is small, an elasticity of 0.2. An increase in farm size has effects on crop and livestock
productivity that are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. The direction of the
impacts are, however, different in the two sectors. An increase in farm size increases livestock sector
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productivity, and the impact is very large--an elasticity of 1.2. In the crop sector, an increase in size
reduces productivity (elasticity of -0.4). One possibility is a decrease in timeliness as size increases in
the crop sector. Griliches (1963) found positive effects of both size and specialization in national
aggregate agricultural data. Hence, our results are a little different, and differences could be due to
degree of data aggregation and (or) different time periods.
When Griliches conducted his study, part-time farming was relatively less common but became
more important later. Our results show that an increase in the odds of farmers off-farm work reduces
crop sector productivity but increases livestock sector productivity. Our arguments for reduced
operator time for acquiring technical information and early technology adoption and limitations on
timing of planting and harvesting activities caused by off-farm work are some reasons for this negative
effect. The reason for the positive (and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level) effect of
off-farm work on livestock sector productivity is not as clear.
The implied reduced-form coefficients (Table 3) show some of the same results as reported in
Huffman and Evenson (1992, 1993b). Some other results are new and receive the bulk of the
emphasis. The specification of the structural model in Table 2 is such that some variables have direct
and indirect effects on agricultural productivity and others have only indirect impacts on productivity
through farm specialization, farm size, or odds of off-farm work and do not enter the structural TFP
equations.
The impact of public crop research on crop sector TFP is positive (elasticity of 0.28) and of
public livestock research on livestock sector TFP is negative (elasticity of -0.21) as in Huffman and
Evenson (1992, 1993b). This study, however, shows additional impacts of public research variables on
TFP through indirect (cross-sector spillover) effects. Additional public livestock research also increases
crop sector TFP (elasticity of 0.14), and additional public crop research also reduces livestock sector
TFP (elasticity of -0.03). The cross-sector impacts of public livestock research provide a significant
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boost toward obtaining overall positive impacts of public livestock research on agricultural
productivity.
Our implied reduced-form coefficients show interesting price effects on TFP. An increase of
the real wage for farm labor and manufacturing labor increase productivity in both sectors with the
impact of the wage for farm labor being much larger than for manufacturing labor. A decrease in the
price of machinery and of commercial fertilizer increases crop sector productivity. These last two
effects seem to be consistent with technical advances and competition in the nonfarm input sectors
leading to new agricultural technologies that use machinery services and commercial fertilizer. The
fertilizer price effects in the livestock sector is opposite that of the crop sector. This is most likely
associated with the substitution possiblies between organic and commercial fertilizer.
Government programs are affecting productivity. Higher crop price supports increase TFP in
both sectors. A higher milk price support has a large positive impact on livestock sector productivity
and a large negative impact on crop sector productivity. Diversion payments are favorable to TFP in
the crop sector but unfavorable to livestock sector productivitiy. Thus, results suggest that reducing or
removing crop and milk price supports will reduce TFP in agriculture.

Summary and Conclusions
Our earlier research primarily focused on econometric evidence of a positive contribution of
public and private agricultural research to state agricultural productivity in a crop sector, livestock
sector, and an aggregate agricultural sector (Huffman and Evenson 1993). We also showed that public
extension, farmer’s schooling, and agricultural commodity programs have been contributors to
agricultural productivity. Our earlier work, however, did not examine the contributions of
specialization, size, or part-time farming to agricultural productivity or the contribution of public and
private agricultural research and other policies to structural change in agriculture.
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In U.S. agriculture, there is a long history of structural change and total factor productivity
change. This paper has presented a framework for conceptualizing structural change when farms may
be multi-product or specialized and an econometric examination of structural and TFP change using
state aggregate data. We found that input prices, public and private research, public extension and
government commodity programs directly and indirectly cause change over the study period in crop
and livestock specialization, average farm size, and the frequency of part-time farming (among
operators engaged in farming) and in total factor productivity of the crop and livestock sectors. We
also found that increased specialization has increased crop and livestock sector productivity, and
increased farm size (or part-time farming) has increased livestock sector productivity but seems to have
reduced crop sector productivity.
A few additional results for the study period are highlighted. First, changes in farm size are
dominated by input price changes rather than by technology (i.e., public and private research) or
government programs. Second, input price changes have been a dominant factor in increasing crop
specialization. In contrast, specialization in the livestock sector seems to be driven primarily by new
technology resulting from research. Third, changes in the structure of agriculture--farm size,
specialization, and part-time farming--were shown to be important channels to productivity increases
in agriculture.
Although the data to which the model of agricultural structure and productivity was fitted do
not extend to the 1990s, the model can be used to predict likely changes caused by the 1996 FAIR Act
which eliminated many of the commodity programs. To make this prediction, we computed the
percentage change in the endogenous variables of the model caused by setting all three of the
government program variables [crop price supports (NPSUPPORT), milk price support (NPSUPMLK),
and cropland diversions (NDVERSION)] to zero relative the respective sample mean value of the
program variables. The prediction is for an increase in average farm size, a decrease in crop
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specialization, an increase in livestock specialization, and a decrease in part-time farming. The
prediction is also for a reduction in crop and livestock sector total factor productivity. The direction of
these changes is unaffected by use of either the structural or reduced form model, but the magnitude of
each change is larger for the structural than the reduced form model.
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1.

The size of the relevant input price vector might also be reduced by dropping the
production of qi.

2.

Sunk costs are ones that have little opportunity value once committed to product qi.

3.

The concept of incremental cost can be extended to product sets that are larger than a single
product (but less than the full product set p).

4.

The concept can easily be extended to a comparison of production of q in n1 versus n0 farms when
n1 > n0 > 2. The farms specializing in producing t outputs of the industry can be denoted the tproducts sector, and the farms specializing in the remaining outputs denoted the p-t products
sector of the industry.

5.

This study does not focus on the number of farms because it does not seem to be closely related
to agricultural productivity when farm size is included. Average farm size and the number of
farms in a state are negatively correlated over time.

6.

Considerable evidence exists that local input markets for mobile inputs, including labor,
are well integrated in the United States.

4.

The specialization indexes used in this paper are totally different from the earlier Huffman and
Evenson (1993a) definition. Additional details about the construction of the specialization
and size indicators are available from the authors upon request.

8.

Of course there is some subjectiveness to our structure. We admit that others
are possible.

9.

They are the actual reduced-form coefficients except for interaction variables.
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Table 1. Definition of Variables
____________________________________________________________________________________
Symbol
Definition
____________________________________________________________________________________
Endogenous
TFPC and
TFPL

Five-year moving average crop sector (C) and livestock sector (L)
multi-factor productivity indexes. Annual TFP series derived as
Tornqvist-Theil output index divided by Tornqvist-Theil input index,
1.00 for national mean 1949-52 averaged using values for the current
and four preceding years (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

SPLZEC and
SPLZEL

Crop (C) and livestock (L) specialization index: Index represents the
extent to which farms in a particular state specialize in the production
of major crop (or livestock) commodities (devised from the farm-type
data, Census of Agriculture, and interpolated between census years;
see Appendix). For each state, the crop and livestock specialization
indexes are normalized by their respective values in 1950.

SIZE

Index of average farm size: Index representing the real service flow
from cropland - equivalent farmland and from other farm capital
stocks (e.g., machinery, breeding stocks). This index is normalized by
its average value over 1949-52.

OF

The share of farm operators reporting any days of off-farm work
(taken from Census of Agriculture and interpolated between Census
years).

OF/(1-OF)

The average odds of off-farm by farm operators.

Exogenous
APPC and
APPL

Stock of public applied crop (C) and livestock (L) research in 1984
dollars, total lag of 33 years, trapezoidal shape weights 7 rising +
6 constant + 20 declining. Research spillins from similar subregions
and regions are included (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

SCC and
SCL

Stock of public pre-technology science crop (C) and livestock (L)
research in 1984 dollars. Lag pattern and spillin as in APP and APPL
(Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

RESC

SCC + APPC: The stock of public crop research.

RESL

SCL + APPL: The stock of public livestock research.

PRIVCG and
PRIVLG

Private crop (C) and livestock (L) research stock in 1984 dollars, total
lag of 33 years, trapezoidal shape 7 + 6 + 20, adjusted for the
number of geoclimatic subregions (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).
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Table 1. (continued)
____________________________________________________________________________________
Symbol
Definition
____________________________________________________________________________________
EXTCG and
EXTLG

Public extension stock having a commodity focus in days per year,
total time lag of 3 years (.5, 0.25, 0.25), adjusted for number of
geoclimatic subregions (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

SCH

Schooling of farmers: average years of schooling completed by rural
males 15-65 years of age, interpolated between census years
(Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

WAGEF

Real wage rate for hired farm labor (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

WAGEMG

Real wage rate for production workers in manufacturing (Huffman
and Evenson 1993b).

PMACH

Price index for farm tractors (Ball 1985).

PFERT

Price index for fertilizer (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

NPSUPPORT

Government crop price support: weighted ratio of support price to
market price for crops (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

NPSUPMLK

Government milk price support: weighted ratio of milk support price
to milk market price (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

NDVERSION

Government crop diversion payments: equivalent price ratio of direct
government crop acreage payments (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

YEAR

Trend

Dr

Share of a state's agricultural land classified in r th geoclimatic
regions, r = 1, ..., 16 (Huffman and Evenson 1993b).

____________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 2.

Three-Stage Least-Squares Estimate of Six-Equation Model of Agricultural Structure and Productivity:
U.S. Aggregates, 1950-82
Crop

Variables

ln MFPC

Livestock

ln SPLZEC

ln MFPL

ln SPLZEL

Overall Average
ln SIZE

ln [OF/(1-OF)]

A. Endogenous Variables
ln SPLZEC
ln SPLZEL

1.129a/
-

-

0.194a/

-

0.065

-2.636a/

-

-0.219a/

0.408a/

ln SIZE

-0.427a/

0.199b/

1.330a/

-0.388a/

ln [OF/(1-OF)]

-0.058b/

-0.146a/

0.116a/

0.180a/

0.805a/

-0.057a/

0.077b/

1.898a/
-

B. Exogenous Variables
ln RESC
ln RESL
ln PRIVCG
ln PRIVLG
ln EXTCG
ln EXTLG

0.731a/
-1.133a/
-

SCH

-0.013

ln RESC x ln PRIVCG

-0.046a/

ln RESC x ln PRIVLG
ln RESC x ln EXTCG
ln RESL x ln EXTLG
ln PRIVCG x ln EXTCG
ln PRIVLG x ln EXTLG
SCH x ln EXTCG
SCH x EXTLG

0.099a/
-0.054a/

-0.006
0.105a/
-0.043a/
-

-

-

-0.015

-

-

-

-0.627a/
-0.341c/
-

0.266a/
-0.156a/
-

0.021

-0.318a/

0.070a/

-0.429a/

-0.413a/

0.648a/

0.241a/

-0.297a/

-0.012

0.167a/

0.558b/

-0.123a/

0.063a/

0.056

0.057b/

-0.012

0.003

-0.037

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.047a/
-0.074a/
0.058a/
0.018c/

ln WAGENG

0.211c/

0.372a/

-0.348a/

-0.417a/

-0.021

2.286a/

ln(WAGEF/WAGEMG)

0.194a/

0.224b/

0.098b/

-0.406a/

-0.281a/

2.051a/

ln(PMACH/WAGEF)

-

-0.016

-

-0.323a/

-0.392a/

0.246a/

ln(PFERT/WAGEF)

-

0.022

-

-0.162a/

-0.036

1.691a/

-0.129

-0.142b/

1.459a/

NPSUPPORT

0.528a/

0.513a/

0.299a/
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Crop
Variables

a/
b/
c/
d/

ln MFPC

ln SPLZEC

Livestock
ln MFPL

ln SPLZEL

Overall Average
ln SIZE

ln [OF/(1-OF)]

NPSUPMLK

-1.942a/

0.749a/

1.290a/

-1.230a/

-0.368a/

2.700a/

NDVERSION

1.551a/

-0.909a/

-0.744a/

0.254

0.483a/

-2.999a/

YEAR

-0.017a/

0.002

-0.031a/

0.038a/

0.032a/

-0.083a/

D1

0.033

0.066

0.241a/

-0.158a/

-0.075c/

0.265c/

D2

-0.057

0.226a/

1.023a/

-0.469

-0.170a/

0.974a/

D3

-0.233a/

0.432a/

1.298a/

-0.462a/

-0.347a/

1.708a/

D4

-0.484a/

0.111c/

0.581a/

-0.282a/

0.180a/

0.340

D5

-0.526a/

0.149a/

0.494a/

-0.272a/

0.022

0.405b/

D6

-0.327a/

0.276a/

0.627a/

-0.711a/

-0.179b/

1.359a/

D7

-0.339a/

0.185b/

0.189

-0.528a/

0.300a/

0.924a/

D8

1.484c/

-0.485

0.182

1.497

-1.498a/

0.630

D9

-0.644a/

-0.119b/

0.946a/

-0.421a/

-0.110b/

-0.304c/

D10

-0.447a/

0.036

0.967a/

-0.516a/

-0.157a/

0.398b/

D11

-2.549a/

1.530a/

6.111a/

0.051

-0.829b/

0.948

D12

-0.536a/

-0.000

-0.102

-0.509a/

0.150

0.372

D13

-0.457a/

0.295a/

0.291a/

-0.123b/

0.040

0.662a/

D14

0.770a/

-0.275b/

0.300b/

-0.564a/

-0.160

-0.094

D15

-1.182a/

1.317a/

2.197a/

-1.218a/

-0.754a/

5.070a/

Interceptd/

20.157a/

-2.310

64.445a/

-76.962a/

-62.008a/

172.445a/

Coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1% level.
Coefficient is significantly different from zero at 5% level.
Coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10% level.
System weighted R2 = 0.702.
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Table 3.

Implied Reduced-Form Coefficients: Model of U.S. Agricultural Structure and Productivitya/
Crop

a/

Livestock

ln SPLZEC

ln MFPL

ln SPLZEL

Overall Average

Variables

ln MFPC

ln SIZE

ln[OF/(1-OF)]

Sample Mean

ln RESC

0.278

-0.013

-0.031

-0.056

0.010

-0.289

16.138

ln RESL

0.136

0.087

-0.210

0.159

-0.005

-0.604

17.063

ln PRIVCG

0.117

-0.127

-0.535

0.213

-0.452

0.211

8.076

ln PRIVLG

-0.066

0.058

0.720

-0.271

0.306

0.020

6.970

ln EXTCG

0.059

0.136

-0.050

-0.036

-0.012

-0.230

-1.582

ln EXTLG

-0.078

-0.015

0.017

0.170

0.107

0.250

-1.787

SCH

-0.072

-0.062

0.054

0.011

0.008

0.147

9.350

ln WAGEMG

0.028

0.151

0.009

-0.060

0.315

0.411

-2.994

ln WAGEF

0.516

0.315

0.225

0.061

0.144

-0.417

0.424

ln PMACH

-0.478

-0.412

-0.072

0.204

-0.286

2.317

-0.920

ln PFERT

-0.032

-0.012

0.016

-0.121

0.009

0.245

-1.952

NPSUPPORT

1.150

0.511

0.142

-0.113

-0.092

-0.109

0.226

NPSUPMLK

-1.158

0.694

1.042

-1.157

-0.045

0.312

0.092

NDVERSION

0.444

-0.827

-0.184

0.095

0.408

-0.007

0.045

Derived from coefficients of structural model in Table 2. Effects of interaction variables in the reduced form are evaluated at
sample mean values in order to express implied reduced-form effects in terms of the primary regressors.

